Florida Law Review
Volume 45

Issue 4

Article 4

September 1993

Phantom Tortfeasors: Parties for the Jury to Consider in Its
Appointment of Fault:
Bryan Aylstock

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Bryan Aylstock, Phantom Tortfeasors: Parties for the Jury to Consider in Its Appointment of Fault:, 45 Fla.
L. Rev. 733 (1993).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol45/iss4/4

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Aylstock: Phantom Tortfeasors: Parties for the Jury to Consider in Its Appo

CASE COMMENTS

PHANTOM TORTFEASORS: PARTIES FOR
THE JURY TO CONSIDER IN ITS
APPORTIONMENT OF FAULT?
Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993)
Bryan Aylstock
Respondent, Ann Main, was injured in an automobile accident while
riding as a passenger in her husband's car.' Respondent sued petitioners
Marie Fabre, driver of the other car involved in the accident, and Eddie
Fabre, husband of Marie Fabre and owner of the other car.2 In her com-

plaint, respondent claimed that Mrs. Fabre's negligence caused the accident? Respondent also sued her uninsured motorist insurance carrier, another petitioner in the case.4 At trial, the judge denied petitioners' request
to have the jury apportion fault between respondent's husband,' who was
the driver of respondent's car but not a defendant in the lawsuit,6 and
Mrs. Fabre7 However, in order to avoid a retrial if this ruling was later
overturned, respondent agreed to submit the issue of her husband's negligence to the jury.' The jury found each driver fifty percent at fault and
awarded respondent $12,750 in economic damages and $350,000 in

* Author's Note: I would like to dedicate this Comment to Lisa Michelle Dostal and to my
parents, Fred and Linda Aylstock, for their immeasurable encouragement and support. I also wish to
thank Professor Joseph W. Little for his guidance.
1. Fabre v. Main, 623 So. 2d 1182, 1183 (Fla. 1993).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See id. The respondent's husband was immune from any liability in this action because the
doctrine of interspousal immunity applied. Id. at 1184. The Florida Supreme Court abrogated
interspousal immunity subsequent to the accident in the instant case. Waite v. Waite, 618 So. 2d 1360,
1362 (Fla. 1993). Therefore, if an identical accident happened today, respondent could sue her husband. Fabre, 623 So. 2d at 1186 n.2. In any event, the petitioners in the instant case could have
sought contribution from the respondent's husband. See Shor v. Paoli, 353 So. 2d 825, 826 (Fla. 1977)
(holding that the common law doctrine of interspousal immunity did not apply to prevent one
tortfeasor from seeking contribution from another tortfeasor who was the spouse of the original plaintiff), limited by Joseph v. Quest, 414 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1982) (restricting application of Shor only to
husband-wife contribution).
7. Fabre, 623 So. 2d at 1183.
8. Id.
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noneconomic damages.9 The trial judge entered an amended judgment for
$357,750 after granting a $5,000 remittitur on the economic damages.
However, the trial judge refused to reduce respondent's noneconomic
damages." The Florida Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial
court's decision on the apportionment of fault 2 stating that Florida Statutes § 768.81(3)" 3 dictates that the jury may only apportion fault between
persons who are parties to the action. 4 The Florida Supreme Court granted review pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution, 5 reversed, and HELD, that under section 768.81(3) a jury must apportion a percentage of fault to all persons whose negligence combined to
cause the injury. 6
In response to a perceived insurance crisis, the legislature passed the
Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986 (Act), 17 which includes section
768.81(3)."8 Prior to the Act, Florida case law had firmly established that
juries could not consider phantom tortfeasors in their assessment of liability. 9 In Lincenberg v. Issen,2" the Florida Supreme Court declared that a
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Fabre v. Marin, 597 So. 2d 883, 886 (3d DCA 1992), rev'd, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993).
FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3) (1993). Section 768.81(3) states:

(3) APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES.-In cases to which this section applies, the court
shall enter judgment against each party liable on the basis of such party's percentage of
fault and not on the basis of the doctrine of joint and several liability; provided that with
respect to any party whose percentage of fault equals or exceeds that of a particular claimant, the court shall enter judgment with respect to economic damages against that party on
the basis of the doctrine of joint and several liability.
Id. -Section 768.81 applies to negligence cases, which "include[], but [are] not limited to, civil actions
for damages based upon theories of negligence, strict liability, products liability, professional malpractice whether couched in terms of contract or tort, or breach of warranty and like theories." FLA. STAT.
§ 768.81(4)(a) (1993).
14. See Fabre, 597 So. 2d at 886.
15. Fabre, 623 So. 2d at 1183. The Florida Constitution states in part that the Florida Supreme
Court, "[mlay review any decision of a district court of appeal ... that is certified by it to be in direct
conflict with a decision of another district court of appeal." FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
16. Fabre, 623 So. 2d at 1184.
17. 1986 Fla. Laws ch. 86-160. Section 2 states in part:
The legislature finds and declares that a solution to the current crisis in liability insurance
has created an overpowering public necessity for a comprehensive combination of reforms
to both the tort system and the insurance regulatory system. This act is a remedial measure
and is intended to cure the current crisis and to prevent the recurrence of such a crisis.
1986 Fla. Laws ch. 86-160, § 2; see also Pamela B. Fort et al., Florida'sTort Reform: Response to a
PersistentProblem, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 505, 551 (1986). The overriding concern of the legislature
in adopting the Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986 was the likelihood that the liability insurance
market would suffer without the Act because insurers, as deep-pocket defendants, would lose money
as a result of paying more than the tortfeasor's proportional share of damages. Id.
18. 1986 Fla. Laws ch. 86-160, § 60 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (1993)).
19. Blocker v. Wynn, 425 So. 2d 166, 168 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) ("Florida case law firmly estab-
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plaintiff is entitled to a determination of damages and that a jury must
apportion liability for damages as a percentage of negligence relative to all
defendants in the lawsuit.2 However, after the legislature adopted section
768.81(3), some defendants began to question whether the legislature had
changed the law to permit allocation of negligence to absent tortfeasors.2 2
In Messmer v. Teacher's Insurance Co.,' the Fifth District Court of

Appeal interpreted section 768.81(3) for the first time. In Messmer,
appellant's vehicle, which was driven by her husband, collided with an

uninsured motorist. 4 Appellant sued appellee, her uninsured motorist insurance carrier, for economic and noneconomic damages.' The arbitrator
found appellant's husband eighty percent at fault and the uninsured motorist twenty percent at fault.' Appellee paid all of appellant's economic
damages and twenty percent of her noneconomic damages.27 The trial

court held that, pursuant to section 768.81(3), appellee had fully satisfied
its liability to appellant.' On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal
affirmed,29 stating that the language of the statute supports the proposition that a party's percentage of fault is calculated from all participants in
the accident."
The Messmer court reasoned that the plain meaning of "percentage is
a proportionate share of the whole"'" and that the plain meaning must
apply in the absence of statutory language altering or limiting the plain
meaning.32 The Messmer court also stated that, even if section 768.81(3)

lishes the principle that in fixing liability the negligence of a non-party tortfeasor cannot be apportioned."); see also Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973) (stating that the jury should
apportion negligence between the plaintiff and the defendant); Gutierrez v. Murdock, 300 So. 2d 689,
691 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) (stating that in order to determine damages, the jury must apportion "the
negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant as related to each other," and disregard any unknown
tortfeasors).
20. 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975).
21. Id. at 393-94. In Lincenberg, the Florida Supreme Court also abrogated the rule forbidding
contribution among joint-tortfeasors. Id. at 391.
22. See Fabre, 597 So. 2d at 883; Messmer v. Teacher's Ins. Co., 588 So. 2d 610, 611 (5th DCA
1991), rev. denied, 598 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1992).
23. 588 So. 2d 610 (5th DCA 1991), rev. denied, 598 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 1992).
24. Id. at 611. Neither appellant's husband nor his estate were parties to the arbitration proceedings. Id. Additionally, appellant's husband could not have been held liable because of the interspousal
immunity doctrine. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 611-12. Appellee paid the noneconomic damages pursuant to the arbitrator's determination that the uninsured motorist was 20% negligent. Id. at 611.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 612.
30. Id. at 611.
31. Id. at 612.
32. Id. But see infra text accompanying notes 68-69 and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 45, Iss. 4 [1993], Art. 4
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

is ambiguous, the obvious legislative intent was to abrogate joint and
several liability and to, instead, equate fault with liability when calculating
noneconomic damages.33 Therefore, according to Messmer, excluding an
absent tortfeasor from the computation of fault would thwart the legislative intent.'
The issue of the correct interpretation of section 768.81(3) next
reached the appellate level in Fabre v. Marin." In Fabre, however, the
Third District Court of Appeal reached a different conclusion than that of
the Messmer court.16 While recognizing it was in direct conflict with
37
Messmer, the Fabre court found section 768.81(3) to be ambiguous.
The court noted that the statute is unclear as to whether trial courts should
consider the fault attributable to all defendants or to all participants in an
accident when entering judgment against each party.38 According to the
Fabre court, the dispositive issue was the meaning of the word "party,"
which the statute did not define.39 The court recognized, "party" may
refer to those persons involved in an accident, the defendants in a lawsuit,
or all the litigants in a lawsuit." Furthermore, courts lack jurisdiction to
enter judgments against nonparties." Therefore, the Fabre court found
that section 768.81(3) has no discernable plain meaning.42

33. Messmer, 588 So. 2d at 611. For an extreme example of how the doctrine of joint and several
liability operated prior to the enactment of § 768.81, see Walt Disney World v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198
(Fla. 1987). In Wood, the operator of an amusement park was required to pay 86% of the plaintiffs
damages, despite the jury's determination that plaintiff was 14% at fault, her fiance was 85% at fault,
and the park operator was only 1% at fault. Id. at 199. The Florida Supreme Court in Wood declined
the opportunity to abolish the doctrine of joint and several liability, instead finding the doctrine's continued viability a matter which was best left to the legislature. Id. at 202. See generally Armando
Garcia-Mendoza, Case Comment, Tort Law: Joint and Several Liability Under Comparative Negligence-Forcing Old Doctrines on New Concepts, 40 U. FLA. L. REV. 469 (1988) (discussing Wood).
34. Messmer, 588 So. 2d at 612.
35. 597 So. 2d 883 (3d DCA 1992), rev'd, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993). For a summary of the
facts of Fabre, see supra text accompanying notes 1-10.
36. Fabre, 597 So. 2d at 886.
37. Id. at 885.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. Additionally, Black's Law Dictionary provides several differing definitions of the word
"party." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1122 (6th ed. 1990). Its broad definition is, "[a] person concerned
or having or taking part in any affair, matter, transaction, or proceeding." Id. This definition would
conform to Messmer's reading of "party" to mean "participants in the accident." See Messmer, 588 So.
2d at 611. However, according to Black's Law Dictionary, " 'party' is also a technical word having a
precise meaning in legal parlance; it refers to those by or against whom a legal suit is brought ... ; all
others who may be affected by the suit, indirectly or consequently, are persons interested but not parties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 1122. Furthermore, "in general, [party] means one having
right to control proceedings, to make defense, to adduce and cross-examine witnesses, and to appeal
from judgment." Id.
41. Fabre, 597 So. 2d at 885.
42. Id.
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The Fabre court then looked to the legislative intent behind section
768.81(3) for guidance.4 3 The court noted that the statute expressly diminishes a recovery only as a result of a plaintiff's own fault." Furthermore, the Fabre court concluded that unreasonable consequences would
result if Messmer's interpretation of section 768.81(3) was adopted and
absent tortfeasors were included in the computation of fault.45 The court
reasoned, for example, that reducing a fault-free plaintiff's recovery on the
basis of her husband's negligence would be unreasonable because it would
ignore the doctrine of interspousal immunity which would bar the plaintiff
from recovering from her husband.46 The Fabre court reasoned that the
intent of the legislature was not to reduce the recovery of a fault-free
plaintiff, but to reduce the recovery only when a plaintiff is contributorily
negligent.4 7 The Fabre court then concluded that "unreasonable consequences" would result if it adopted Messmer's interpretation of section
768.81(3).4
In the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court reviewed the decision
of the Third District Court of Appeal based upon its certified conflict with
Messmer.49 The instant court disagreed with the Third District Court of
Appeal's interpretation of section 768.81(3), instead favoring the interpretation of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Messmer."° The Florida
Supreme Court's interpretation
of section 768.81(3) represents a dramatic
51
reversal of Florida tort law.
The instant court held that section 768.81(3) is unambiguous.5 2 According to the instant court, the only means of determining a party's percentage of fault is to compare it with everyone who contributed to the
accident.53 Furthermore, the statute mandates that judgment shall be en-

43. See id.

44. See id.
45. Id. at 866.
46. Id. However, this is no longer the case in Florida. See supra note 6.

47. See Fabre, 597 So. 2d at 886.
48. Id.
49. Fabre,623 So. 2d at 1183.
50. See id. at 1185-86.
51. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
52. Fabre, 623 So. 2d at 1185.
53. Id. The instant court also referred to other jurisdictions and authorities which have reached
the same conclusion. See id. at 1186. In Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867 (Kan. 1978), the Kansas Supreme Court interpreted a statute similar to § 768.81 as meaning that the negligence of phantom
tortfeasors must be apportioned by the factfinder. See id. at 867. For a survey of approaches to fault
apportionment to absent tortfeasors, see Peter H. Pogue, The Apportionment of Fault to Unidentifiable
Tortfeasors Under Indiana's Comparative Fault Statute: What's in a "Name?", 23 VAL. U. L. REV.
413, 430-35 (1989). The Uniform Comparative Fault Act provides that the jury only consider the
respective liabilities of the parties in the litigation. UNIF. COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 2(a)(1)-(2), 12
U.L.A. 39 (Supp. 1984).
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tered against each party based on that party's percentage of fault." In the
instant case, the petitioners were fifty percent at fault; therefore, in holding
petitioners liable for one hundred percent of the damages, the trial court
entered a judgment against petitioners in excess of their percentage of
fault and in direct conflict with the wording of the statute. 5
The instant court also found that even if the statute is ambiguous, the
legislature intended courts to apportion damages between all participants
in an accident." The instant court looked to section 2 of the Act to find
that the intent of the legislature in passing section 768.81 was to require
each defendant to pay for noneconomic damages only in proportion to the
fault attributed to the defendant in causing the accident. 7 Also, by eliminating joint and several liability through section 768.81(3), the legislature
decided that, in the case of noneconomic damages, plaintiffs must take the
defendants as they find them.18 According to the instant court, a court
acts unfairly when it forces defendants who are only ten percent at fault to
pay one hundred percent of the damages, and no existing social policy
compels defendants to pay more than their fair share of a plaintiffs
loss."
However, according to the dissent in the instant case, the statute does
not require the majority's conclusion.' The dissent found the majority's
interpretation was "at odds with the very essence of tort law, which provides that ... [an] innocent victim should be made whole by receiving
damages from a negligent party."'" The dissent found the language of
section 768.81(3) to be ambiguous and lacking of any clear legislative
intent applicable to the instant facts.62 Instead, the dissent found section
768.81(3) susceptible to at least two equally plausible interpretations of
legislative intent.6 3 Therefore, the dissent concluded that the interpretation
54. Fabre, 623 So. 2d at 1185.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. This statement is ironic because, traditionally, it was the defendants who were forced to
take the plaintiffs as they find them (in accordance with the eggshell skull rule). See Silva v. Stein,
527 So. 2d 943, 944 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988) (stating that it is a familiar and accurate doctrine that "the
tortfeasor takes the plaintiff as he finds him"); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS §43, at 291-92 (5th ed. 1984) (setting forth the eggshell skull rule and declaring
its near universality in common law jurisdictions).
59. See Fabre,623 So. 2d at 1187 (citing Brown, 580 P.2d at 874). The instant court extended its
reasoning to the companion case of Allied-Signal v. Fox, 623 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 1993). In Fox, the
plaintiff was injured on the job. Id. at 1181. The Florida Supreme Court held that the percentage of
fault of the plaintiff's employer must be apportioned by the jury even when an employer is immune
from tort liability under workers' compensation laws. Id. at 1182.
60. Fabre, 623 So. 2d at 1188 (Barkett, C.J., dissenting).
61. Id. (Barkett, C.J., dissenting).
62. Id. (Barkett, C.J., dissenting).
63. Id. (Barkett, C.J., dissenting). Compare Fabre, 597 So. 2d at 883 (apportioning fault between
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of the Third District Court of Appeal in Fabre should be followed because
it most closely adheres to the goals of traditional tort law.'
Although the instant court extensively quoted the Third District Court
of Appeal's reasoning,' it never addressed what the lower court found to
be the pivotal problem with 768.81(3)-that the statute never defines the
ambiguous word "party."' Instead, the majority found the statute unambiguous because, "[cilearly, the only means of determining a party's percentage of fault is to compare that party's percentage to all of the other
entities who contributed to the accident."'67 However, the instant court
failed to recognize that Florida case law, including decisions by the Florida Supreme Court,68 has long established that in comparative negligence
actions the factfinder must apportion a percentage of fault only to those
parties in the lawsuit, ignoring absent tortfeasors.69 Furthermore, the majority did not address the statutory language that, "the court shall enter
judgment against each party liable on the basis of such party's percentage
of fault."7 As the Third District Court of Appeal recognized, courts lack
jurisdiction to enter judgments against nonparties.7 Therefore, the logical
inference is that the legislature intended "party" to mean only those litigants in the lawsuit.
The instant court bolstered its reasoning by stating that even if the
language of the statute is ambiguous, the legislative intent of section
768.81(3) was to replace joint and several liability with a system whereby
the parties pay only in proportion to their percentage of fault.72 Even assuming this was the legislative intent, it does not answer the determinative
issue in this case-who should the factfinder include in deciding the percentages of fault? The instant court engaged in circular reasoning by stating that because the petitioner in this case was found to be fifty percent at
fault, it would be contrary to the statutory languageP3 and incongruous for

defendants in the lawsuit) with Messmer, 588 So. 2d at 610 (apportioning fault between participants in

the accident).
64. Fabre, 623 So. 2d at 1188 (Barkett, CJ., dissenting).
65. Id. at 1184.
66. See id. at 1185; supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. The differing definitions attributed
to the word "party" by the Third District Court of Appeal and the Fifth District Court of Appeal provide additional evidence of the word's ambiguity and of the overall ambiguity of § 768.81(3). See
Brief of Arnicus Curiae Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers Supporting Position of Respondent, Ann

Marin at 2, Fabre, 623 So. 2d at 1182 (Nos. 79869, 79870).
67. Fabre, 623 So. 2d at 1185.
68. See Lincenberg, 318 So. 2d at 393-94; Hoffman, 280 So. 2d at 431.
69. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.

70. FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3) (1993).
71. Fabre, 597 So. 2d at 885.
72. Fabre, 623 So. 2d at 1185.
73. FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3) (1993). "[T]he court shall enter judgement against each party liable
on the basis of such party's percentage of fault .
I.."
Id.; accord Fabre, 623 So. 2d at 1185.
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the legislature to intend that petitioner pay one hundred percent of the
damages.74 The reasoning is faulty because if respondent had not agreed
to allow the jury to consider her husband's negligence, petitioner would
have been found one hundred percent at fault75 and a court could enter a
judgment against petitioner for one hundred percent of the damages without contradicting any statutory language.76 Indeed, this is probably what
the legislature intended.77 Also, the instant court did not discuss the lower
court's reasoning that because the statute expressly provides for reduction
in the plaintiff's recovery only as a result of the plaintiff's own fault, the
reasonable interpretation is that the legislature did not intend to reduce a
fault-free plaintiff's recovery in a situation where a tortfeasor is absent
from the suit.78
The instant court also neglected the age old axiom that statutes in
derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed.79 As the dissent indicated, the language of the statute certainly does not compel the
majority's decision in the instant case.8" Therefore, the instant court
should have adopted the interpretation which most closely adheres to the
traditional goals of tort law-to force the negligent defendant to compensate the fault-free plaintiff.8 However, the instant court found something
inherently unfair about forcing defendants to pay more than their fair share
of the loss.8" Although this reasoning may seem sensible, it is faulty because it fails to recognize the significance of the causation requirement in
the law of negligence. In order for a plaintiff to recover anything from a
defendant in a negligence action, the factfinder must determine that but for

74. Fabre, 623 So. 2d at 1185.
75. Id. at 1185-86. This is because the jury could only have considered the fault of the lone
defendant in the lawsuit. See 1986 Fla. Laws ch. 86-160, § 60 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.81
(1993)).
76. See Fabre, 597 So. 2d at 885-86.
77. See Wood, 515 So. 2d at 201-02.
78. See Fabre, 597 So. 2d at 885-86.
79. See Ellis v. Brown, 77 So. 2d 845, 847 (Fla. 1955). "[S]tatutes are to be construed in reference to the principles of the common law; for it is not to be presumed that the legislature intended to
make any innovation upon the common law further than the case absolutely required." Id. (quoting
Jones, Varnum & Co. v. Townsend, 2 So. 612, 613 (Fla. 1877)); see also Hialeah v. State, ex rel.
Morris, 183 So. 745, 747 (Fla. 1938) (stating that it is presumed that a statute is not intended to
change the common law "unless the statute is explicit and clear" in this regard); City of Pensacola v.
Capital Realty Holding Co., 417 So. 2d 687, 689 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (stating that a statute changing
the common law "must be in clear and unequivocal terms, for the presumption is that no change in the
common law is intended unless the statute is explicit in that regard"); Varner v. Goldshein, 216 So. 2d
759, 760 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (stating that "statutes must be construed with reference to the appropriate principles of the common law" and should be construed so that they do not conflict with those
long settled principles).
80. Fabre, 623 So. 2d at 1188 (Barkett, C.J., dissenting).
81. See id. (Barkett, C.J., dissenting).
82. See id. at 1185.
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the negligence of the defendant, plaintiff would not have been injured."
Therefore, a law does not operate unfairly when it allows a fault-free

plaintiff to recover full compensation from a defendant who is partially
responsible for the injury and able to pay.'
The instant decision places a substantially increased burden on the.
plaintiff. Now, in order to recover against the defendants named in the
lawsuit, plaintiff must not only establish the prima facie elements of negligence against those parties, but must also contend with the probability that
defendants will seek to persuade the jury that the absent tortfeasor was the
one at fault. Therefore, the plaintiff will be forced to defend the absent

tortfeasor (or empty chair). Furthermore, plaintiffs will be more reluctant
to settle with one or more of the parties because to do so would mean
defending the empty chair." The instant decision may also have the ef-

fect of discouraging joinder by defendants.86 Under the instant court's
interpretation, defendants are much less likely to join other parties as

defendants in a suit because it is easier to blame the empty chair. Another
probable consequence of the Fabre decision is that more potential
tortfeasors will be sued. Prudent plaintiffs, through investigation and discovery, will take care to identify and sue all potential defendants; other-

wise, they risk receiving a diminished recovery. 7

83. See Jones v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 463 So. 2d 1153, 1156 (Fla. 1985) (stating that a defendant
is liable for injuries produced in a natural and continuous sequence by his conduct such that but for
the conduct, the injury would not have occurred); Fellows v. Citizens Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 383
So. 2d 1140, 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (stating that for the requirement of causation to exist, there
must be such a natural, direct and continuous sequence between the negligent conduct and the injury
so that it can be reasonably found that but for the conduct, the injury would not have occurred); W.
PAGe KEaToN Er AL., supra note 58, § 41. at 265-68 (stating that conduct cannot be regarded as a
cause of an injury if the particular injury would have occurred without it).
84. See Fabre,623 So. 2d at 1188 (Barkett, C.J dissenting).
85. Additionally, on the same day as the Florida Supreme Court issued the opinion in the instant
case, it held that Mary Carter agreements were per se invalid. See Dosdourian v. Carsten, 624 So. 2d
241, 243, 246 (Fla. 1993). A Mary Carter agreement is a settlement vehicle whereby the agreeing
defendants remain in the lawsuit, but the plaintiff agrees to limit their financial responsibility, usually
in inverse proportion to the amount of recovery which the plaintiff ultimately receives for the
nonagreeing defendant or defendants. See id. at 242 (citing Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d 385 (Fla.
1973)). Before Dosdourian, the Florida Supreme Court had held that Mary Carter agreements were not
per se invalid, but were discoverable and could be disclosed to the jury. See Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So.
2d 385, 387-88 (Fla. 1973). The Dosdourian decision burdens the plaintiff further because now defendants who have limited their liability with Mary Carter agreements cannot remain in the lawsuit to
defend themselves against the remaining defendants' attempt to shift the blame. See Dosdourian,624
So. 2d at 241. For additional information on how Mary Carter Agreements operated, see generally
June F. Entman, Mary CarterAgreements: An Assessment of Attempted Solutions, 38 U. FLA. L. REv.
521 (1986).
86. See Nancy Thofner, Note, The Modification of Joint and Several Liability: Consideration of
the Uniform ComparativeFault Act, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 288, 304 (1984).
87. Helen A. Hauser, Comparative Fault in Florida:Apportionment of Damages Among Absent
Parties and/or FormerParties, Offset, CollateralSources, and Contribution, FLA. BJ., Feb. 1993, at
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By quashing Fabre and approving Messmer, the Florida Supreme
Court has acted as a superlegislature. Its interpretation of the statute was
not required by statutory language or legislative intent, but seems to have
been arrived at by an overriding policy to protect the deep-pocket defendants. The instant court's decision also ignored a basic tenet of our legal
system-that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly
construed. This lack of judicial temperament will severely damage innocent plaintiffs' recoveries. Furthermore, the instant court's decision places
Florida plaintiffs in the unenviable position of having to defend an absent
tortfeasor because many of the tortfeasors named in lawsuits will undoubtedly concentrate their defense on blaming the empty chair. Furthermore,
lawyers can no longer be confident in making sound legal arguments;
rather, they must now look for policy arguments to appease the court.

12, 20.
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